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ABSTRACT: The World Development Report (WDR) for 2009, Reshaping Economic Geography,  is 
assessed through four distinct but overlapping prisms. One is of economics imperialism, the colonisation 
of the other social sciences by neoclassical economics in general, of which the new economic geography is 
one instance. A second is the putative shift from the Washington Consensus to the post Washington 
Consensus and the presumption of a more tempered stance on the state and poverty alleviation. A third 
is the complex and shifting relationships between ideology (or rhetoric), scholarship and policy as it 
emanates from the World Bank. And the fourth is by reference to the crises of the environment and the 




The focus of the World Bank’s, World Development Report for 2009, entitled 
Reshaping Economic Geography and shortened here to WDR09, offers an opportunity 
to assess the state of play of the so-called new economic geography (NEG), on which 
the Report heavily if not exclusively draws. But, to put it bluntly for maximum effect, 
WDR09, is not a serious work of scholarship other than on its own narrow terms. Yet 
it does need to be taken seriously. In this critique, I seek to locate its contribution in 
the context of the evolution of an economics imperialism (EI) that has incorporated 
both the NEG, see Section 2, and the new(er) development economics, Section 3. This 
allows much of the content of WDR09 to be fixed in terms of its substantive content, 
although it also allows for some flexibility, Section 4. The final section remarks upon 
the extraordinary absence of both climate and finance from the Report and concludes 
by seeking a renewal of political economy and geography as a means to address the 
specific with the systemic. 
 
II. NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AS ECONOMICS IMPERIALISM 
 
From the perspective of those working within the discipline of (economic or human, 
and even I suspect, physical) geography, the WDR09 is extraordinarily limited in the 
theory, concepts, methods and the corresponding literature upon which it draws.  
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This is so much so that the suspicion must be that this is not a deliberate 
choice on the part of its authors but an almost unimaginable display of ignorance and 
lack of scholarly integrity as far as commitment to relevant literature is concerned. 
The academic economist is much more likely to look into a well-established technical 
toolbox based on orthodoxy than other treatments of the topic at hand that tend to be 
dismissed as lacking rigour or science for any departure from a deductive method. 
For, as observed of the Report (Maringanti et al. 2009, p. 47): “Only six citations are 
to geography journals, in a 25-page bibliography; five are authored by card-carrying 
economists and the sixth was published 40 years ago. Of the 250 or so individuals 
thanked for their contributions, comments, guidance and support at the end of the 
Report from all over the world, two are geographers (as far as we know)”. 
Of course, such neglect is not only true of the WDR09 itself but also of the new 
field of new economic geography upon which it draws as will be only too familiar to 
critical economic geographers. Critiques of NEG are devastating and almost as 
longstanding as the field itself, pointing especially to lack of originality and 
knowledge of literature and of consideration of the social (re)construction of space 
itself in any meaningful sense (Martin 1999, Fine and Milonakis 2009), and a cascade 
of corresponding absences as has been remarked upon already by reviews of the 
WDR09 by geographers (Bryceson et al. 2009, Rigg et al. 2009, Scott 2009, Harvey, 
2009 and Maringanti et al. 2009).1 
There are those in a much better position than me to make these criticisms, 
and they should be made again and again, tedious and unrewarding though the task 
may be, both in order to defend economic geography against the designs of the NEG 
and to highlight and promote richer and more soundly based alternatives. Otherwise, 
of course, the NEG will simply prosper as it has already done so by virtue of the dull 
compulsion of its proponents’ untiring and well-rewarded efforts. What I would 
emphasise in addition is that the narrowness of the NEG from the perspective of 
geography looks entirely different from the perspective of (mainstream) economics 
where the presumption is that an unduly confined discipline is broadening both its 
explanatory content and scope of application. In this respect, the encroachment, to 
put it mildly, of economics onto geography is far from unique as the same process has 
been involved across the other social sciences although, it is to be emphasised, the 
incidence, depth and content of such initiatives are differentiated by discipline and 
topic for a range of reasons around both supply and demand for them to deploy the 
vernacular.  
In other words, how does the emergence of NEG relate to what has been 
termed “economics imperialism”, the colonisation of the other social sciences by 
economics. This is a matter both of substance and chronology, as is evident from the 
historical logic of economics imperialism (Fine and Milonakis 2009). For the latter 
derives from the now standard microeconomic principles (axiomatic deduction from 
optimising behaviour around utility and production functions) that were first adopted 
and then developed and refined following the marginalist revolution of the 1870s. By 
the 1950s, the logical development of the principles had reached fruition with the 
formal results around supply and demand derived from individual optimisation, and 
the aggregation of corresponding rational economic behaviour over all individuals, in 
conditions of perfect markets, to allow for general equilibrium. From this point on, 
these microeconomic principles became more or less sacrosanct and the mark of an 
increasingly exclusive professionalised and Americanised discipline, especially in the 
wake of what has been dubbed the formalist revolution (1950s) led by Samuelson.  
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Paradoxically, though, the triumph of these principles logically could only be 
achieved in the first instance at two great closely related costs. On the one hand, to 
obtain them required what is best described as an implosion around the core 
principles, discarding methods, concepts, factors, even realism, to obtain the required 
results so that utility becomes reduced to a logic of choice from given preferences over 
given goods, and so on, the taking of the historical and the social out of economics. On 
the other hand, until the 1950s, such endeavours were perceived, even within the 
discipline of economics itself, as at most filling out one small part of individual 
economic behaviour as opposed to addressing the role of more rounded individuals 
and systemic analysis. Significantly, in the thirties, what is now dubbed the old 
institutional economics, founded and most closely associated with Thorstein Veblen, 
was as prominent as today’s mainstream in the United States. And, of course, 
Keynesianism emerged as a response to the Great Depression with the fledgling 
microeconomics scarcely capable of addressing its systemic concerns either 
analytically or in policy terms (how to sustain full employment through manipulation 
of effective demand). 
In short, the historical place of microeconomics within the discipline 
immediately after the Second World War was for it to be both subordinate to 
macroeconomics and for it to be more or less confined, however sufficiently from a 
more critical point of view, to supply and demand within the market. However, the 
logic of the principles, once established, was one of universal application as utility 
maximisation and its corresponding technical apparatus are without historical or 
social specificity (other than by critical reference to the environment of the 
intellectual origins that spawned them). This historical logic has given rise to a 
tension in the scope of application of microeconomic principles, one with a distinct 
and paradoxical chronology in outcome. As already indicated, prior to the formalist 
revolution of the 1950s, the principles imploded in content and application in order to 
be able to be established. But, once established, subject to favourable inner and outer 
conditions, that excluded content could be broached once more, albeit in the reduced 
form compatible with the core principles, in an explosion of application both within 
the discipline and across the social sciences more generally.2 
As a result, EI first began to take hold from the 1950s onwards in a first phase 
in which the non-economic was treated as if equivalent to a market. In retrospect, 
Gary Becker took the lead, across a number of applications of which human capital is 
the most prominent, but it also included public choice theory and the new economic 
history pioneered by Douglass North. Despite these successes, the appeal and scope of 
EI remained limited, primarily because of the limited success within the discipline of 
microeconomics itself as Keynesianism and various more rounded, empirically-based 
elements of applied economics continued to hold sway. This all changed with the 
collapse of the post-war boom, the triumph of neo-liberalism and the emergence of a 
particularly virulent and extreme attachment to methodological individualism and 
hype-rationality, the New Classical Economics, in which markets are perceived to 
work perfectly and the state is ineffective at the macroeconomic level and distorting 
at the microeconomic level. As put in (Lucas, 1987, p. 108), “the term ‘macroeconomic’ 
will simply disappear from use and the modifier ‘micro’ will be superfluous”. We are 
even served up with real business cycle theory in which fluctuations in the economy 
are either due to random shocks and/or to the rhythm of voluntary unemployment as 
workers tend to choose to be in the labour market when productivity increase is 
faster. 
                                                 
2 See Fine (2007) for the hypothesis that more account was taken of the assumptions involved in taking the historical 
and social out of economics in the passage from marginalist to formalist revolution than in bringing them back in 
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The impact of such developments within the discipline, apart from supporting 
neo-liberalism ideologically, was to consolidate the technical apparatus associated 
with its peculiar form of methodological individualism, to reduce macro to micro (the 
systemic to the individual), and to pose opposition in terms of explaining why markets 
might work imperfectly despite optimising behaviour. Within economics, this soon 
gave rise to a new microeconomics, in a reaction against the new classical economics,  
of emphasising market imperfections in general (although these were far from new as 
such), with the idea of imperfect information as the novelty in explaining why 
markets might be efficient, not clear, or fail to emerge at all in some cases. In 
addition, emphasis could be placed on externalities and increasing returns to scale as 
market imperfections requiring property rights and account of transaction costs and 
institutions as a means to handle them. The result was not only to reconstruct a 
version of Keynesianism based on micro-foundations and to reinvigorate the 
piecemeal case for state intervention (to improve static efficiency). In addition, the 
way was opened for a new phase of EI, and one much more palatable in varying 
degrees to the other social sciences. For, instead of treating the non-economic as if 
equivalent to a market, it could be understood as the response to market 
imperfections. So economist could now proudly announce that institutions, history, 
customs, culture, even apparently non-rational behaviour, matter despite what they 
might have said in the past, as they represent the rational, individualistically based 
but possibly collectively evolved, response to market imperfections.  
The result was to open up or to renew fields within economics and EI. There 
has been a proliferation, literally, of “new” fields – such as the new growth theory, 
new labour economics, new welfare economics, new financial economics, new 
economic sociology and, of course, new development economics and new economic 
geography.3 Some of these might better be termed “newer”, as they depart from the 
“new” in emphasising market imperfections as opposed to as if perfect market 
accounts of the non-economic.4 
I will discuss development economics subsequently but where does this 
drastically abbreviated account locate the NEG? What is striking is its relative 
absence within the first phase of EI. This is not to say that questions of uneven 
(spatial) development were unaddressed at the time from a variety of perspectives – 
as in the old development economics, see below, and the work of Gunnar Myrdal in 
particular, and the more or less radical versions of regional science, such as (Perroux 
1950) and gravity-like models for location theory. In addition, economic geography 
itself was otherwise embarking upon a trajectory that has been totally incompatible 
with EI, not least in the two influences of postmodernism (across the social sciences 
as a whole) and Marxism (especially strong within geography) that came to the fore 
from the 1980s onwards. See Barnes (2001) for an informative account. In short, for 
the new economic geography to emerge, it was necessary to have moved to the second 
phase of EI, and for both neo-liberal and postmodernist discourse to have waned as 
                                                 
3 Some wish to exclude the new economic sociology, NES, from the menu of economics imperialism, seeing it, from 
Granovetter onwards, as a critique from sociology of the limited assumptions and methods of economics. My own view, 
though, is that the new economic sociology is a mixed bag including, at one extreme, more wide-ranging and deeper 
criticisms than offered by Granovetter (around collectivities and meanings of networks for example) and, at the other, 
a reductionism of the sociological to the economic. This is indicative of the different forms, directions and impacts of 
economics imperialism across disciplines and topics. For the NES, there is a mixed amalgam at the boundaries of the 
two disciplines although not leading, as (Hodgson 2008) would suggest to an evaporation of the separate disciplinary 
contents. 
4 Ultimately, the newest form of economics imperialism is to wed the new and newer to supplementary behavioural 
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began to occur, at least in the intellectual arena (most notably with the rise of 
“globalisation” studies) from the 1990s onwards.5 
Given more conducive conditions, NEG took off, and it did so in two different 
mirror image variants with corresponding common features. One, now closely 
associated with Paul Krugman and his collaborators, and possibly more influential 
with (economic) geographers in search of deterministic theory, essentially obliterates 
geographical difference (in physical terms) so that it can be (re)constructed out of the 
distribution of economic activity whose location as opposed to patterns are more or 
less accidental, and determined by first-mover (dis)advantages. As opposed to this 
“technicist” approach, as I will term it, is the “physicalist” approach, closely (and 
previously) associated with Jeffrey Sachs for example, in which the specificity of place 
in terms of (dis)advantage (proximity to coast for transport, climate, prevalence of 
disease, etc) is all important. The differences between the technicist and the 
physicalist approaches are not simply theoretical in terms of source of prime causal 
factor but also a matter of method, with the technicist primarily provided abstract, 
deductive models of equilibria with uneven outcomes and the physicalists relying less 
on theory, other than as a backdrop, and running regressions of economic 
performance against varieties of geographical determinants. 
It is essential to emphasise, though, that both approaches substantively depart 
from mainstream orthodoxy in economics in the most minimal of ways, simply 
drawing upon increasing returns to scale as a rationale for uneven spatial 
distribution of economic activity. Even here, it is necessary to import arbitrarily 
prominent assumptions that seem both trivial and yet mountain-moving. The 
imperfectly competitive consequences of increasing returns to scale are attached, in 
the technicist approach, to quality differences in products that are craved by 
consumers as a device to explain intra-industry international trade. As often, this is 
driven by the analytical requirements necessary to be able to deduce desired 
mathematical results as opposed to any serious consideration of the diversity of 
quality in consumer products and how they relate to consumer culture and 
commercial success. More generally, there is an isomorphic mapping between the two 
branches of the new economic geography and the new growth theory. For the latter, 
there is a theoretical branch which turns speculative or casually identified 
microeconomic market imperfections into increasing returns and endogenous growth 
(the more we invest and produce the more we increase productivity as opposed to 
given growth rate of old growth theory). And there is an empirical branch, Barro-type 
regressions, which run multiple regressions of hundreds of variables to determine the 
sources of growth. Significantly, new growth theory and the new economic geography 
both emerged and flourished at the same time, from the mid-1980s. As a 
simultaneous reflection of economics imperialism, no economic and social variable 
was safe from theoretical and empirical (and policy)6 designs of an exploding 
orthodoxy.7 Nonetheless, both strands of NEG, in light of their respective origins in 
speculative abstract theory as opposed to physical geography, respectively, tended to 
                                                 
5 For the dual retreat of social science from the extremes of neo-liberalism and postmodernism, see Fine and 
Milonakis (2009). 
6 New growth theory offered a growth- (and hence poverty-) elasticity for every economic and social policy variable, see 
Devarajan et al. (2002) in the context of the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, PRSPs, and Fine 
(2006b) for a critique. 
7 For my critique of new growth theory, see (Fine 2000, 2003 and 2006a). Significantly, whilst still heavily present 
within economic orthodoxy, the theoretical and empirical gloss that it once commanded has now lessened. More 
sophisticated growth econometrics, for example, has shown Barro-type regressions to have been fundamentally flawed 
in method, incapable of providing definitive results, and (readily overlooked) the empirics themselves are inconsistent 
with the theory (growth is not steady, for example, as is required by equilibrium growth paths). See especially 
Rodriguez (2006), Islam (2003) and Durlauf et al. (2006) but also, for a laugh from their titles, Sala-i-Martin (1997) as 
opposed to Hendry and Krolzig (2004). THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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eschew social variables variously gathered under the rubric of institutions and the 
new institutional economics around which a critique could be launched especially 
against the physicalist approach.8 
Here, though a further point should be emphasised from within economics 
(over and above those that derive from a more considered understanding of space 
itself that is not flattened out to exclude social relations and meanings). This is that  
NEG proceeds on the basis of the methodology, method and techniques of mainstream 
economics by which the implosion of content allowing it to be established is more or 
less entirely, but not totally, preserved (what economists pride themselves on in 
terms of theoretical parsimony). This is not simply a matter of the absence of the 
historical and the social (the institutional as orthodox critics from within would have 
it) and even more rounded individuals in anything other than an ideal sense, but the 
erasure of the state, class, conflict, power, politics, ideology and so on. This gives rise 
to merely mechanical modelling on a simplified axiomatic deductive basis, driven by 
the explicit or implicit assumption of increasing returns to scale and the consequences 
for equally reduced narrowly interpreted physicalist outcomes (there are no cities, 
rivers, seas, mountains, etc in the NEG, other than to define ideal locations for 
economic activity, as with circular cities for example, or as the means to define 
transport and transaction costs and land values, and so on for regression purposes).9 
Related to this is a factor that primarily goes unnoticed other than by a few, 
careful and disregarded critics not least because economics as a discipline plays scant 
attention to its own history and, paradoxically, lays claims to scientific rigour, inner 
coherence and logic whilst always sacrificing them in deference to its core 
microeconomic principles. For, the ability to bring back in increasing returns to scale 
to a technical apparatus that studiously excluded them to obtain its core results is, 
not surprisingly, fraught with dangers for that technical apparatus. One of its leading 
exponents has put this extremely well (Arrow 2000, p. 173):10 “The steady history of 
competitive equilibrium theory and the contrasting history of increasing returns 
theory are themselves conditions on the coherence of one theory and the lack of it in 
the other … Increasing returns arguments have been applied fruitfully … but one has 
to start again each time. In particular, what should be the core of any economic 
theory, a theory of value, is still not yet well defined.” 
In other words, in the presence of increasing returns, we have no theory of 
price, how the market grinds out supply and demand through the market mechanism. 
Significantly, in much NEG, the market is erased altogether leaving no mechanism 
for more or less efficient allocation of production to more or less arbitrary locations. 
Where is the market itself that ought to occupy pride of place in any economics, let 
alone one that praises its allocative role? How are prices formed when productivity is 
                                                 
8 The institutionalist critique is especially associated with Daron Acemoglu and his colleagues. See Acemoglu et al. 
(2000) - and the response by McArthur and Sachs (2001) which is revealing in its abstract in setting the nature and 
scope of the debate: “Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) that suggest weak institutions, but not physical 
geography and correlates like disease burden, explain current variation in levels of economic development across 
former colonies. Using similar data and expanding the sample of countries analyzed, our regression analysis shows 
that both institutions and geographically-related variables such as malaria incidence or life expectancy at birth are 
strongly linked to gross national product per capita. We argue that the evidence presented in Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson is likely limited by the inherently small sample of ex-colonies and the limited geographic dispersion of those 
countries” (McArthur and Sachs 2001, abstract).    
9 On a personal note, I first started studying economics in 1971, and, because I had a degree in mathematics I was 
immediately introduced into the closed workshop of the handful of mathematical economists at the University of 
Oxford, including Mirrlees, Stern and Dixit (my tutor). I still recall the discussion of the square city where transport 
was held at rest for half the time by traffic lights to prevent accidents at crossroads. I simply suggested that drivers 
might seek to turn just before the lights. 
10 See Mirowski (2007) for Arrow’s dual role of both progressing and promoting mainstream economics and exposing 
its limitations on its own terms. THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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changing even as they are being formed.11 What comes first, the places or the prices, 
and so on. These problems could be avoided in the absence of increasing returns, since 
the economy is essentially timeless and without scale and can, therefore, be situated 
wherever, as thick or thin as you like. In other words, NEG only addresses one 
problem – its own version of spatial development – by erasing another, and more 
fundamental, value theory.12  
Of course, exactly the same observation applies to the new growth theory that, 
as indicated, is essentially NEG with more factors arbitrarily thrown in – as is even 
implicitly acknowledged by orthodoxy itself (Schmutzler 1999). Growth takes place 
without the market and without prices, because of increasing returns or other factors 
such as health, education, spillovers, and so on to include a hundred or more 
variables. As suggested, these are omitted rather than included within (theoretical 
models for) NEG. And this is necessarily so for analytical reasons, and not just 
because of mathematical intractability. Once we start to incorporate other variables, 
the whole edifice becomes indeterminate, not least the role of the state in any of its 
increasing returns appropriating policies given the extraordinary advantages of being 
first-comer.13 As is observed of themselves in accepting the first Alonso prize (Fujita 
and Krugman 2004, p. 142): “Put one thing on top of another, and it all starts to look 
too complicated to convey any insights. But provided one is willing to make some silly 
but convenient assumptions … things need not be so bad.” 
The issue is, though, convenient, bad and silly for whom? For, we are sternly 
told that the apparently unambiguous case for state intervention to accrue economies 
of scale has to be set against the inclination of policymakers to abuse their power in 
pursuit of self-interest. But this reinforces the point that such issues have to be taken 
into account as much as those of increasing returns, agglomeration, transport costs, 
and so on. And, of course, even accepting that NEG establishes spatially 
differentiated outcomes, there is a bit more to this than the virtues or vices of 
policymakers. We are, after all, addressing the history of the world, its formation of 
nation-states, internal and external wars, imperialism, slavery, and so on. For NEG, 
these tend to be retro-fitted with the result that the history serves the theory rather 
than vice-versa in its representation or, more usual and important, its absence.  
Accordingly, for WDR09, history is a teleology displaying the triumph of Nobel 
economists such as Lucas on new growth theory, variously distributed across the 
document, and for the British industrial revolution, (WDR09, p. 204): “With more 
secure individual property rights to land, English cities grew rapidly. Indeed, 
England may have been the first to industrialize because it introduced such rights 
before other European countries. The Nobel prize–winning economist Douglass North 
uses this to spotlight what land institutions can do for long-run growth and 
development. The “enclosure” movement made individual private property rights 
possible. Starting around 1500 open commons were fenced, hedged, or otherwise 
closed off and deeded or titled to individuals. By 1545 around 40 percent of England’s 
surface area belonged to private individuals. The Enclosure Act of 1604 fostered the 
conversion of open commons into private plots, which continued until the early 
twentieth century. Most researchers agree that enclosures in England increased 
agricultural productivity, which released labor from the land, and provided the food 
surplus to support the rapidly increasing urban population. This allowed England to 
become, for a time, the “workshop of the world”. 
                                                 
11 Note Smith and Marx are the only prominent economists to address this problem, how are values formed as 
technology is changing, see Fine (1982) and Milonakis and Fine (2009). 
12 The same is even true of “rationality” assumptions which come into question with increasing returns to scale 
because of the need to act strategically in relation to the preferences, actions and beliefs of others. 
13 Is it accidental that the developmental gains associated with (urban) development do not figure in NEG? THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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No less breathtakingly simple and, essentially ahistorical for what it leaves 
out of account, is the astonishing suggestion of “Spatial inefficiency and the downfall 
of the Soviet Union” (WDR09, pp. 90-91), and background note (Treyvish 2008), and 
we thought it might have something to do with the Cold War or other internal or 
external factors. 
  Not surprisingly, then, within the WDR09, there is a heavy erasure of 
historical time and physical space, only introduced as more critical economists are 
wont to remark, in order that everything does not take place simultaneously in the 
same location.14 Where time and space are used it is for own narrow convenience. 
There is, for example, no world economy other than for trading and migration for 
given nation-states upon which a more or less arbitrarily detailed teleology is 
imposed. Development is first and foremost industrialisation and urbanisation to 
accrue economies of scale, inevitably leading to growing (homogenised) inequality (so-
called divergence) with rural and other areas that can ultimately benefit from 
compensating social policies and migration to ameliorate inequality (convergence). 
Crucial here, and simply overlooked, is to deploy the vernacular, the continuing 
impact of first-mover advantages within and between nation-states and the 
correspondingly remarkable end or lack of history for those that have realised the 
teleology both for themselves and for their impact upon those lagging behind (this is 
otherwise known as strategic interests or how did our oil get under their sand). And, 
of course, such an idealised teleology leaves unaddressed the question of when, by 
when and why not already for those who have yet to realise its benefits. Is it seconds 
or millennia over which these processes play themselves out,15 an issue of some 
relevance to the billions of the world’s population who have not embarked upon the 
journey to the promised land even if they are making their way to the most 
convenient city. 
In short, why, then, do some factors get taken into account, such as economies 
of scale and product variety, as opposed to others? As remarked, on the one hand, 
they reflect the mildest of breaks with continuing core methods. On the other hand, it 
is simply a matter of extending these on the basis of purely speculative reason. 
Consider Romer, the pioneer of new growth theory, who explicitly reveals his working 
methods to (Snowdon and Vane 2005, p. 686): “Schumpeter coined some wonderful 
phrases like “creative destruction” but I did not read any of Schumpeter’s work when 
I was creating my model … I really worked that model out from a clean sheet of 
paper. To be honest, the times when I have gone to try to read Schumpeter I have 
found it tough going. It is really hard to tell what guys like Schumpeter are talking 
about [laughter]”. 
And Krugman is similar in some respects. The model is the thing, manipulated 
as necessary to tease out outcomes to correspond to stylised facts (core-periphery 
patterns of development, for example) or novel results for orthodoxy,16 pushing the 
consequences of deduction beyond reasonable limits given what is absented from 
                                                 
14 “While Joan Robinson quoted [Henri] Bergson as saying that ‘time is a device to stop everything from happening at 
once’, the late Dharma Kumar suggested that ‘space is a device to stop everything happening in Cambridge’”, 
http://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/susan/cyc/q/quotes.htm. 
15 There is some reference via Lucas to the idea that it might take decades (WDR09, p. 161): “Even in the rapidly 
growing economies of the post-colonial world, the passage from a 90 percent agricultural economy to one that is 90 
percent urban is a matter of decades”. 
16 Note that economics imperialism has also had the effect of appropriating heterodox economics, as the hagiographic 
Elmslie (2010, p. 12), citing Krugman for various topics in development: “The 1980s and 1990s saw many cases of 
mainstream economic theory crowding out heterodox theory by using the everexpanding standard set of tools to better 
understand issues long part of heterodox theory … Thus, Krugman can be held at least partly responsible for the 
identity crisis that has plagued heterodox economics for the past 30 years, as orthodox theory came to dominate many 
traditionally heterodox areas of research”. 
Whether there is such an identity crisis is a moot point and, if so, it is the intolerance of the orthodoxy more than its 
expansion that is responsible. See Lee (2010). THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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consideration (not least the role of the state and policy, see above, let alone the 
exercise of political power at the global level). Is it unfair to point to the theory of 
interstellar trade (Krugman 1978), when goods travel at the speed of light and so 
arrive at a different time for those travelling as opposed to observing them (raising 
questions of what interest to charge over period of transit)? As he says himself, 
excusing the spoof, “This paper, then, is a serious analysis of a ridiculous subject, 
which is of course the opposite of what is usual in economics” (Krugman 1978, p. 2). 
But the same might be said of NEG!17 
 
III. FROM PRE- TO POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
 
Because of its universalism, one of the striking, endearing even, features of NEG is 
that it ranges over the fortunes of single industrial districts to the spatial history of 
the world, with Krugman for example happily and casually adopting the language of 
core-periphery without any apparent awareness of its roots in dependency and world 
systems theory or earlier uses in regional planning such as Friedmann (1966). By the 
same token, the same principles apply to development as they do to space. 
Consequently, new (and newer) development economics shares analytical principles 
with NEG as well as subject matter to a large degree, see below. Nonetheless, the two 
do have different histories by virtue of origins and trajectories. 
  Development economics first emerges as an acknowledged field immediately 
after the Second World War as a response to decolonisation and competing influences 
at a global level from the USA and the USSR. For reasons already laid out for the 
division between macro and micro, the latter was considered totally inappropriate for 
understanding the systemic issue of development. Instead, orthodoxy was dominated 
by empirically and historically grounded analyses, more attuned to the old 
institutional economics, giving rise to what has subsequently been dubbed the old or 
classic development economics, with notions of modernisation to the fore in the sense 
of the need for developing countries to emulate the social and historical processes 
identified with the emergence of western capitalism. Empirical and inductive 
measures were to the fore in seeking regularities in the nature and processes of 
development.  
Significantly, and to some extent ironically, economic history in the United 
States tended to be located within economics departments, as a result of the earlier 
strength of the old institutional economics, and was a teaching requirement. By 
contrast, development studies as a discipline was located in a fragmented fashion 
across other disciplines. Accordingly, in the first phase of economics imperialism, such 
economic history was immediately subject to an assault from mainstream economics 
in the form of the new economic history or cliometrics. As its leading pioneer as 
economist was to put it, mainstream economics should be used to address historical 
problems irrespective of any realism (North 1963).18 On the other hand, (the old) 
development economics remained relatively untouched and alternative political 
economy approaches prospered within the discipline, across other disciplines and in 
newly-founded development studies departments around the world, removed from 
economics as such. See Fine (2009a) for a fuller account.  
  This all changed with the collapse of the post-war boom, the rise of neo-
liberalism and the emergence of the new development economics as a form of 
                                                 
17 Note that (Vromen 2009) categorises Krugman’s interstellar piece as funny economics, a joke, as opposed to 
economics for fun in which he places the intentionally serious freakonomics. But he also demonstrates that the 
distinction between the two cannot always be maintained. He also rejects the notion of economics imperialism on 
empirical grounds or, at least for lack of evidence, but seems blissfully unaware of NEG, new development economics, 
new economic history, etc. 
18 For critique of North, see Fine and Milonakis (2003) and Milonakis and Fine (2007). THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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economics imperialism of the first phase albeit delayed. This soon co-existed with, 
and was superseded by, a newer development economics characteristic of the second 
phase of economics imperialism. For this, (lack of) development is seen as a 
consequence of the way in which institutions, etc, respond to market imperfections. 
Within economics, the old development economics was increasingly marginalised (if 
surviving to a greater or lesser degree within development studies) and development 
economics became subordinate to the application of universal principles, see 
Corbridge (2007) on “monoeconomics” in development studies. As pioneering 
neoliberal chief economist at the World Bank and a major proponent of the new 
development economics, puts it in the first issue of the World Bank Research Observer 
(Krueger 1986, p. 62): “Once it is recognised that individuals respond to incentives, 
and that ‘market failure’ is the result of inappropriate incentives rather than non-
responsiveness, the separateness of development economics as a field largely 
disappears”. 
Whilst the newer development economics is probably less extreme in its 
dismissal of its subject matter as a separate field, it shares this stance other than in 
allowing for endogenously generated market imperfections.  
  Significantly, of course, as Chief Economist, Krueger played a prominent role 
at the World Bank in the early 1980s in clearing out the old development economists 
and replacing them with the new, and the corresponding promotion of what has 
become known as the Washington Consensus. This involved departure from what can 
now be termed the pre-Washington Consensus at the Bank for which, corresponding 
to the old development economics, an extensive role for the state was accepted in 
terms of the modernisation associated with Keynesianism, welfarism, 
industrialisation, provision of economic and social infrastructure and so on. The 
structural adjustment and stabilisation policies associated with the Washington 
Consensus have been heavily debated, and criticised, as has the subsequent post 
Washington Consensus inspired from 1997 onwards by market imperfections Chief 
Economist, Joe Stiglitz. The new consensus is deeply rooted in the newer development 
economics, and offers a piecemeal understanding of development and policy in terms 
of the incidence of, and remedies to, specific market and institutional imperfections. 
  The trajectory from pre- to post-Washington Consensus is not then unilinear 
as is evident in the relative stances taken on the role of the state – going from 
extensive, especially for infrastructure, to minimal before currently occupying an 
intermediate position. On the other hand, other aspects of the Bank’s role have moved 
continuously in the same direction. One is to have been increasingly wedded to 
mainstream economics. Second is to have expanded scope of interest both across the 
economy and from the economy to the social. Third, understanding and specifying the 
nature of development has become subordinate to policymaking. Fourth has been the 
Bank’s increasing projection and, ultimately designation, of itself as a knowledge 
bank in which it occupies a central position in developmental thinking, policy and 
advocacy even by way of those offering critical departure. Fifth has been the 
increasing incorporation of development studies along all of these lines. Sixth, both 
the Washington Consensus and the post Washington Consensus, in contrast to the 
pre, have no concept of development as such as opposed to a means, paradoxically, to 
achieve it, reliance upon the market or its correction, respectively. 
  But the situation is even more complex than this in that the Bank’s positions 
are constituted out of the three components of ideology (rhetoric or advocacy), 
scholarship, and policy in practice. As emphasised in Fine (2001, 2010), especially in 
the context of social capital as a developmental buzzword at the World Bank, the 
relationship within each of these across topics is not consistent, or even coherent, and 
the same is even more so across these elements. This is not to say that each element 
is independent of the other, only that the relationship between them is variegated 
and shifting across time and topic. Thus, in general terms, policy under the THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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Washington Consensus was heavily interventionist under the ideology of non-
intervention, with the promotion of private capital being paramount, especially of 
finance. Further, under the nominally more state-friendly post Washington 
Consensus, the policies or conditionalities associated with the Washington Consensus 
have, in practice, both tightened and been extended to a wider range of interventions, 
(van Waeyenberge 2009), and see below on health and education. As it were, whereas 
the Washington Consensus allowed for discretionary intervention under the rhetoric 
of promoting free markets, the post Washington Consensus does the same on a wider 
terrain on the basis of correcting the market. Further, the shift from the one to the 
other corresponds to a broader shift between two phases of neo-liberalism – a shock 
phase in promoting private and international capital, especially finance, followed by 
one of extensive intervention to sustain the process and temper its worst effects (from 
privatisation to public-private partnerships, for example, and more attention to the 
dysfunctional consequences of adjustment) to allow for safety nets, MDGs and PRSPs. 
As is apparent, then, one conduit for economics imperialism has been through 
the deployment of differently denominated types of capital. This most immediately 
allows the corresponding factors to be incorporated into the mainstream’s pre-existing 
technical apparatus. Human capital is an early and enduring example but there has 
been a “plethora” of capitals, each associated with some aspect of economic or social 
functioning, with natural and environmental capital familiar to geographers. 
Ultimately, over the past twenty years, with the World Bank having taken a lead in 
its promotion in general and in development studies in particular, social capital has 
come to the fore even if its origins are not from within economics. It essentially fills 
out the entire gamut of resources and functioning that cannot be reduced to narrowly 
economic and/or individual alone. For social capital in particular, but much more 
generally, there is an extraordinary fetishism involved in separating the economic 
from the non-economic, and attaching them, respectively, to capitals that are not or 
are, social, respectively, with a heavily physicalist interpretation of as much of these 
capitals as possible (to fit, to put it crudely, into a production function). 
  There is, however, another route through which economics fills out the non-
economic (as it has itself defined the shifting boundaries between the two as 
amenable to its technical and conceptual apparatus). This is to seize upon one or more 
generic concept that can serve as proxy for whatever has not yet been covered. Again 
an early example is provided by “institutions”, and it endures across the various 
phases of economics imperialism in the form of the new and the newer institutional 
economics, inspiring the new and newer economic history. Such conceptualisations 
have been analytically underpinned by marginal deviations from purest forms of 
market functioning as with the introduction of transaction costs, imperfect 
information, definition of property rights, externalities and, most notably for NEG, 
increasing returns to scale.  
Significantly, of course, the latter alone serves Krugman in foisting upon us 
not only NEG but also new(er) trade theory and, if to a lesser extent on his own 
account, the newer development economics. And it is important to recognise that his 
stellar rise derives primarily from his exploitation of increasing returns to scale 
across his chosen areas of application. This puts him in one camp of contemporary 
economics and economics imperialism, which also includes the new growth theory, as 
opposed to the other which is more likely to emphasise the market imperfections 
arising out of imperfect information as with Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz, Nobel Prize 
Winners as such in 2001.19 For the latter, emphasis tends to be upon static 
inefficiencies that can be corrected now, whereas the IRS/NGT approach is focused 
                                                 
19 There appears to be analytical and possibly personal rivalry between those mainstream economists who rely upon 
increasing returns as opposed to market as informational imperfections even if they agree over the need to see 
markets as working imperfectly. THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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upon outcomes over time. Whilst both rely upon highly idealised, simplified and 
universalised models of the economy, the IRS/NGT also tends to be more ambitious in 
its empirical, that is econometric work (although this does not tend to be spawned by 
the theorists themselves). In particular, whilst for mathematical tractability it is 
necessary only to include only a few variables within models, these are used (quite 
illegitimately) to throw as many variables as desired in statistical work (as many as 
150 for example in the NGT in estimating the sources of growth). 
 
IV. FIXING THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (WDR) 2009  
 
Against this extensive background, how are we to interpret the WDR09? As already 
indicated, reviews from geographers have assessed it as a work of scholarship and, 
with exceptions, have found it to be understandably drastically wanting. But this 
approach to the WDR09 is itself mistaken. It is not and should not be considered a 
work of scholarship. Significantly, for example, there does not seem to be a single 
review within an economics journal and, I suspect, that this is typical if not so 
extreme of previous WDRs. Further, if not for the first time, as usefully revealed by 
the Deaton Report (Deaton et al. 2006) in an evaluation of World Bank research from 
1998 to 2005 by mainstream economists from within the perspectives of mainstream 
economics, such research is revealed to be heavily influenced by the imperatives of 
advocacy as opposed to quality and intellectual integrity.20 This is not to say that the 
WDR09 is uninformed and uninfluenced by scholarship, only that it is not scholarship 
itself without myself setting about defining what this means precisely. I have 
struggled to find an appropriate analogy for this. It is as if the World Bank decided to 
focus the next WDR on crime (not too far off the mark given it is on Conflict, Security 
and Development for 2011), and asked Quentin Tarantino to make a feature film on 
the issue. His account has no attachment to crime as such, only to other select and 
genre media representations of crime. Much the same is true of the WDR09’s use and 
even manufacture (for use) of scholarship (through its background papers). 
There are two techniques worth highlighting in this Kill Bill scholarship. One 
is what I call boxonomics. It involves the showcasing of select evidence and case 
studies to support the arguments (the industrial revolution, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the success of the United States, see below). Often these are not without 
interest but they never stand up to close scrutiny on either theoretical or empirical 
terms nor to generalisation to other case studies. The other is what I call the XY 
syndrome. This takes two separate issues, complex enough on their own, such as 
growth and inequality, and brings them together. Magically, despite their individual 
complexities, simple relations can be drawn by bringing the two together. Is 
migration (especially urbanisation) good for growth or not, and similarly for regional 
integration. To be fair, especially in the background papers to this WDR09, something 
more akin to an XYZ… syndrome is involved, and results reported are more qualified 
in part in deference to presence or not of other factors, and use of more sophisticated 
econometric methods than simple XY regressions. 
But what are we to make of the conclusion from a complex statistical exercise 
correcting for labour market characteristics, from Background Report, (Clemens et al. 
2008), that suggests, “a marginal wage increase of at least $10,000 pa for next worker 
allowed to move from a developing country to US”. The implication that the WDR09 
                                                 
20 For a critical assessment of World Bank research, taking the Deaton Report as critical starting point, see Bayliss et 
al. (2011). Note that spirited defense by Buckley (2009) of the WDR09 by reference to the Deaton Report is wide of the 
mark as revealed in Deaton’s subsequent work, free of the constraints and restraints of his role in chairing the 
evaluation (and venting the frustration in its being totally ignored), and his personal communications with myself. 
See, for example, the uncompromising suggestion in Yusuf (2009, pp. 113-4) that,  “the development expertise that is 
the centre of the World Bank’s mission may not exist in useful form or, at the least, needs to be fundamentally 
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would wish to draw is that, ceteris paribus, migration is the best policy for poverty 
reduction (and might be thought to dominate any of the gains to be made from the 
heavily promoted freedom of movement of goods). Yet, whilst interesting and 
suggestive, this exercise tells us absolutely nothing about how labour markets work 
to generate these wage differentials and, so, what the impact of interventions would 
be.21 Do we really believe, other than as tautology that removing all constraints on 
the mobility of labour would lead to equitable outcomes in labour markets, even if 
$10,000 currently measures, however accurately, the weight of their presence for the 
marginal worker?  
Boxonomics and the XY syndrome are widely used by the World Bank to 
marry scholarship and advocacy. More specifically for the scholarly influences on this 
WDR09, first, in taking the NEG/Krugman route of economics imperialism, the 
analytical framework deployed is both to draw upon increasing returns to scale and to 
attach these to a broader but still limited set of universal (ahistorical and asocial) 
principles by which to explain everything. There are, for example, the three Ds of 
distance, density and division, complemented by the three Is of institutions, 
infrastructure and incentives. These are supplemented by circular causation, 
neighbourhood and spillover effects, agglomeration, specialisation, transport and 
transaction costs, and so on.  
Second, by virtue both of the subject matter and the shift from Washington to 
post Washington Consensus, there are, admittedly faint, legitimising hints of 
restoring the old development economics.22 The Report (p. 33) begins with Kuznets 
makes reference to Adam Smith not for virtues of the market but for the significance 
of the division of labour, and emphasis is placed upon the virtues of unbalanced 
growth (and necessity for growing inequality to achieve development prior to the 
spread of the benefits). Here, it is important to recognise how impoverished is the 
restoration, deriving as it does from a simple technical exercise (the microeconomic 
implications of increasing returns to scale extended both to world economic history 
and development policy) complemented by a particular version of the history of 
(development) economics itself whereby precursors were correct but incapable of 
representing their ideas in acceptable mathematical forms (as opposed to accepting 
the limitations of such microeconomics relative to more rounded inductive 
methods).23 However, this flavour of the old development economics within the 
new(er) is heavily trumped by the absence of reference to other scholarly work on the 
subject of increasing returns in the passage from Adam Smith to Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) (for which increasing returns allow for imperfect competition).24  
Third, much heavier than the restoration of the old development economics is 
that of the pre-Washington Consensus, again if in diluted form, but through an 
apparently unwitting appeal to modernisation, acknowledged if incorrectly by 
Maringanti et al. (2009, p. 46) as a revival of the much more refined and wide-ranging 
Rostow and stages of economic growth. What is remarkable, possibly inadvertent 
especially in relation to critical literature on modernisation, is the extent to which the 
                                                 
21 As Deaton (2009, p. 14) has argued “The general lesson here is once again the ultimate futility of trying to avoid 
thinking about how and why things work; if we do not do so, we are left with undifferentiated heterogeneity that is 
likely to prevent consistent estimation of any parameter of interest”.  
22 Does this help to explain that nostalgia for the old development economics is now condoned, see Yusuf (2009). 
23 This sort of view was initiated by Krugman (1994) and is too readily accepted (Harvey 2009, p. 1276) for example. 
For the quality of the scholarship that informs Krugman’s account of the “the rise and fall of development economics”, 
see his opening, “This is not exactly a paper about Albert Hirschman. In the first place, I am unqualified to write such 
a paper. My acquaintance with Hirschman’s works is very limited. In essence, the Hirschman I know is the author of 
The Strategy of Economic Development and little else. So I am in no position to write about his larger vision”.  
24 On neglect of such literature, see Rigg et al. (2009, p. 130), Harvey (2009, p. 1275) and, more generally, as Scott 
(2009, p. 584) puts it, “the neglect of geographers’ work in the Report is all of a piece with a very much more troubling 
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model of development arising out of NEG is imposed both upon the history of the now 
developed economies and the future path of those presumed to be in the process of 
developing. It is not simply that this WDR09 unusually devotes so much of its text to 
developed countries but these, and especially the United States, are taken as the 
model to be emulated. A particularly rosy picture is painted of the path of inequality 
in the USA with its previously unbalanced and unequal growth now evened out by 
low transport costs, spread of the benefits of development and internal migration. 
There seems to be little awareness of current controversies over public health 
provision let alone the unprecedented rise in income inequality over the past thirty 
years, reversing the previous trend and witnessing the share of income of the top 1% 
of earners rising from under 10% to over 20%. Race, gender and other divisions 
simply do not arise. 
Fourth, the WDR09 is also selective in its treatment of (international) trade. 
On the one hand, increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition allow for 
international intra-industry trade to be explained as opposed to the specialisation 
associated with orthodox trade theory and comparative advantage. On the other 
hand, the consequence of this is to provide the inescapable rationale for protection to 
promote national, infant-industry champions.  This is simply overlooked for the 
virtues of allowing the market to decide what (urban) development should take place 
where, with the state at most facilitating and supporting the choices rather than 
making them. For, on the international arena, “market potential is a powerful driver 
of increases in income per capita and average wages … results show that in 2003, 
bringing the market potential of the Congo Democratic Republic to the one of 
Thailand is predicted to increase its GDP per capita by a factor of around 24”, from 
background paper (Mayer 2008, p. 20). And, within the nation, “New noncapital cities 
that seem to succeed are those where the purpose and location are chosen over time 
by markets and in cases in which the government hastens the pace of growth by 
coordinating investments in infrastructure, housing, and general governance. For 
these reasons, cities and towns should be seen as market agents that, just like firms 
and farms, serve market needs” (WDR09, p. 145). What is remarkably absent, rather 
than absented as in case of the state as source of success, are firms themselves as 
opposed to the market as agent of judicious locational choice. Despite the attention to 
intra-industry international trade, and the breaches with specialisation, comparative 
advantage and orthodox trade theory, there is no mention at all of the extent to which 
the vast majority of decisive trade, especially in manufacturing, takes place within 
the confines of individual firms through their internationally organised multi-
nationally located affililates. In short, it is not the market that decides at all but 
General Electric and the like, ably assisted no doubt by government.  
Fifth, as indicated, the various elements that go into making up the new 
economic geography, let alone the ideology, scholarship and policy in practice of the 
Bank’s treatment, are far from coherent and consistent in their combination. By the 
same token, this allows for some innovation and idiosyncrasy in the outcome. This is 
especially so in relation to both the prominence of, and the stances adopted on, 
migration (as well as the variety in layering of policies for different levels of 
government from local through to international regional). In other words, essentially 
a strong rejection of the thesis of what might be summed up as urban bias could not 
have been anticipated, as well as the corresponding propositions that development 
requires unbalanced growth around urban areas through migration that should be 
permitted in order that more balanced growth (and equality) can be achieved 
subsequently through spread of the benefits.25 
                                                 
25 The striking mix of the ad hoc with populism is also characteristic of the treatment of agriculture, see Oya (2011). THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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Sixth, then, this suggests that it is mistaken to take a rigidly deterministic 
interpretation of the WDR09 or World Bank research, etc, more generally. It cannot 
simply be reduced to the imperatives of a particular set of more or less (neo-liberal) 
ideologies, theories or policy imperatives. In other words, in cruder terms, the WDR09 
is not to be seen as a conspiracy to convey and foist preconceived conclusions upon a 
more or less receptive audience. This reflects neither the nature nor the process of 
producing the WDR09 (with the added advantage of such flexibility in content 
legitimising a sense of openness). Nonetheless, as should be heavily emphasised, the 
space for breach from institutionalised requirements is both amorphous, if unevenly 
so, and tightly constrained. This is evidenced by the controversies that have 
surrounded dissident research within the Bank, including the prominent resignation 
over production of the WDR itself for 2001.26 What is crucial for the Bank, if putting 
it in conspiratorial terms, is that its research, etc, should legitimise its policies in 
practice either by supporting them directly or by placing a veil over them. 
In this respect, the WDR09 is totally complicit in its support for the “market”, 
that is private capital, and the facilitating role of the state. Amazingly, the filling out 
of space (location of cities, for example) is treated as a market mechanism just like 
the filling out of economic activity, best left to the self-discovery of those involved 
since, to repeat the extraordinary fetishism, “towns and cities should be seen as 
market agents … just like firms and farms”, p. 145. This does, though, have to be seen 
in the context of the current phase of neo-liberalism, one in which the state is 
explicitly required to support the private sector rather than simply being replaced by 
it. Bear in mind, for example, that critics of the Bank’s over-homogenising of the 
nature, causes and consequences of urban migration (first unbalanced step in 
development, the divergence before the convergence) have suggested that, in Africa, it 
reflects a greater degree of movement to access public services. The Bank is ready for 
this, anticipating with its own support, that 60% of growth in future health provision 
will derive from the private sector, (IFC 2009).27 Essentially, privatisation never 
appears within the WDR09, an implicit recognition that it has both already been 
accomplished as far as possible and that the private sector now needs the state to 
intervene discreetly and discretely to reconstruct the spaces within which hordes of 
migrant labour can be exploited. 
 
 
V. FROM FINANCE TO CLIMATE BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
 
Reference to privatisation (and development by way of public ownership that often 
made it possible) is by no means the only notable absence from the WDR09. To put it 
bluntly, it is not only as if the current financial crisis does not exist, the same is more 
or less true of finance itself. There is an embarrassing exception in light of recent 
events (p. 206): “When a country’s financial system is more developed and mature, the 
public sector can encourage a secondary mortgage market, develop financial 
innovations, and expand the securitization of mortgages. Occupant-owned housing, 
usually a household’s largest single asset by far, is important in wealth creation, 
social security, and politics. People who own their house or have secure tenure have a 
                                                 
26 Rigg et al. (2009, p. 131) suggest that the WDR09 “reflects the extent to which relatively orthodox economists are 
once more in absolute ascendance inside the Bank following a decade of internal debate about development, perhaps 
best reflected in the furore over the 2000/2001 WDR, which led to the resignation of the team’s Director, Ravi 
Kanbur”. As argued elsewhere, especially in the context of social capital, this is a total and self-serving misreading of 
the loss of ascendancy of the World Bank’s economists in the period highlighted (Fine 2008, 2010). There was no such 
loss but it did allow for the economists to range more widely and freely and create the illusion, for some, of their loss 
rather than their greater reach of hegemony! 
27 See also “Private Schools Urged to Acquire Capital Finance”, www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/220/703621. THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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larger stake in their community and thus are more likely to lobby for less crime, 
stronger governance, and better local environmental conditions”. 
But the implicit Panglossian view of subprime apart, there is much more to 
this than the simple neglect of the relationship between finance and development and 
their influence upon economic geography.28 For finance itself poses an extraordinary 
challenge to the NEG even if, no doubt, it is sufficiently inventive to meet it on its 
own terms by the dual appeal of declining transaction costs, on the one hand, and the 
benefits of agglomeration, on the other.29 Needless to say, there is total neglect of the 
continuing geography of finance literature (and debate about whether location 
remains relevant or not,30 it certainly does!) let alone any sense of the increasingly 
systemically inefficient role of finance in the era of financialisation, as most 
dramatically revealed by the current crisis. How do we explain that three times as 
many financial assets are needed to service one unit of GDP than thirty years ago, 
and the continuing concentration of financial power in specific locations, especially 
the United States (and the reserve role of the dollar) despite its deficits and minimal 
interest rates. And what are and have been the implications of this for the location of 
economic activity? A stunning silence is the only answer as finance is reduced to 
money and money to a neutral veil that is neither seen nor heard. If combined and 
uneven development is to be explained over the period encompassing both the East 
Asian NICs’ miracles and the more general neoliberal aftermath, it must surely 
address the end of the Cold War, the nature of US hegemony, the role of the nation-
state in the new world order, the transformations in labour markets (not least in 
China) and the nature and incidence of new technologies. Each of these takes at most 
a secondary role within the technicist and physicalist approaches to the NEG.  
  And neglect of finance, just as it uncomfortably, prominently, and 
dysfunctionally occupies the world stage, is complemented by an almost absolute 
absence of the environment, remarkable for an account of economic geography. No 
doubt, this might be excused by acknowledging that this serves as the topic of the 
next WDR for 2010. Even so, one might have expected the word climate to have 
appeared more times in the context of the “natural” environment than for the 
inevitably and heavily promoted (private) business climate. Apart from pointing to 
the “negative externalities of transport” (pp. 190-2) as congestion, emissions and 
pollutions, the WDR09’s analysis is confined to the boxonomics in support of the 
proposition that “Climate change calls for a different urban form, not slower 
urbanization” (p. 211).31 It concludes that Atlanta should build more stations for its 
metro so that it is used as much as in Barcelona. There is, of course, a total absence of 
systemic and global analysis - how do we know that such measures do not merely 
create the space for more pollution to continue as is integral to cap and trade and 
offsets. See Lohman and Sexton (2010) for a brief account - but more than a whiff of 
fiddling whilst Rome burns.  
But the World Bank is no Nero, and is fiddling or, more exactly, orchestrating 
to deal in carbon trading (at over 10% commission) and to occupy the off-set finance 
for developing countries for environmental measures that may or may not accrue. 
                                                 
28 Consider, for example, the role of finance in South(ern) African development - even without which the universal 
propositions of the WDR09 do not begin to gain any purchase on the appropriate questions let alone appropriate 
answers concerning the nature of racialised patterns of development (Fine 2009b) for recent considerations. 
29 Note that the absence of finance within NEG is itself in part a reflection of the previously observed tendency to 
absent markets (and value theory) in deference to the logic of (physical) increasing returns. 
30 For recent contributions in light of the crisis, see special issue of the Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and 
Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2009. 
31 Note that the World Bank accommodates the apocalyptic vision of Swyngedouw (2009, 2010) of climate change by 
projecting the calm of business as usual. 
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That this should be viewed with dismay by developing countries and activists is 
hardly surprising. It is a recipe for continuing largesse towards the developed world’s 
polluting and the thick end of a wedge already in place in applying conditionalities to 
Bank finance – quite apart from the dirty business as usual as the Bank prepares to 
make its biggest ever energy loan in Africa to underpin dirty coal-fired power stations 
in South Africa (Hallowes 2009). 
Effective absence, then, of finance and the environment from the WDR09’s 
NEG is par for the course alongside those absences that have been previously 
highlighted above and in geographical critiques. Of course, the latter’s 
understandable response has been to deplore the absence of geographers and the 
geographical in the round, the square and most other shapes. I would, however, both 
in relation to the WDR09’s NEG and World Bank “research” more generally, put this 
differently. What is wrong, at least in the first instance, is not the economist’s 
impoverished geography but their impoverished economics. This has to be addressed, 
both logically and strategically, before its geography can be put right although it is a 
task upon which geographers can and must engage if, in part, by way of dialogue with 
their own political economy. The marriage between geography and political economy 
is essential for an offspring that draws upon and locates both the systemic and the 
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